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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FIRST INVENTORS DEFENSE ACT (35 U.S.C. § 273): HAVE
PRIOR USER RIGHTS IN PATENT LAW BEEN RESURRECTED?

The Congress shall have Power. . .To promote the
Progress of. . .useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to. . .
inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries;
-U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1999, the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 was signed into law.1 One provision of this new
legislation is entitled “The American Inventors Protection Act” and contains
anticipated changes to the administration of the United States patent system.2
In addition to reorganizing the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the Act
creates a legal claim against fraudulent invention promoters, lowers various
patent and trademark registration fees, extends patent terms to remedy delays
in the patent registration process, outlines the domestic publication of patent
applications, creates an inter partes patent reexamination procedure, and
establishes an affirmative defense against patent infringement actions.3 It is
this last change, referred to most commonly as “The First Inventors Defense
Act of 1999” (FIDA),4 that is the focus of this comment.
The First Inventors Defense Act of 1999 is, in part, a legislative response
to the somewhat controversial decision5 by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc. (State Street) wherein the long-standing (ninety years) “business
method exception” to patentability was overturned.6 Judge Rich stated, for the
majority, that “we take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to
1. Charles E. Van Horn, Overview of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, at
http://www.aipla.org/html/newpatentlaw.html (last visited June 15, 2001).
2. Pat Costello, New Law Creates a Patent Infringement Defense and Restructures the
Patent and Trademark Office, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 16 (1999), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume6/costello.htm.
3. Id.
4. Codified as 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2001).
5. See generally John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 1139 (1999).
6. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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rest”7 and held the claimed invention (the transformation of data) produces a
useful, concrete and tangible result.8 The Congressional response to the State
Street decision, in the form of an affirmative defense to infringement, 35
U.S.C. § 273 (FIDA), however, appears to stem more from the lower court’s
invocation of the business method exception to hold the invention at issue
unpatentable9 than from the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the holding.
Commentators and the PTO assume and widely espouse that the
affirmative defense is restricted to “methods of doing business.”10 A closer
7. Id. at 1375. The Court implied that this ruling was long overdue. “Since the 1952 Patent
Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements
for patentability as applied to any other process or method.” Id.
8. Id. at 1373:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it
produces “a useful, concrete and tangible result”—a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades.
Id.
9. Id. at 1376-77. The affirmative defense provided in 35 USC § 273 would be available to
financial institutions who were already practicing such a method but not to any party “desirous of
implementing” such a system. In the excerpt below, the Federal Circuit quotes (but also dismisses
as a reason for a finding of invalidity) the district court’s concern that if held valid, the ‘056
patent would shut out competitors using “any computer implemented accounting method . . .”:
If Signature’s invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous of
implementing a multi-tiered funding complex modeled (sic) on a Hub and spoke
configuration would be required to seek Signature’s permission before embarking on such
a project. This is so because the ‘056 Patent is claimed [sic] sufficiently broadly to
foreclose virtually any computer implemented accounting method necessary to manage
this type of financial structure.
Id. (quoting State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D.
Mass. 1996)).
10. Thomas, supra note 5, at 1140. See also Steven E. Lipman, First Inventor Defense
Under the AIPA, Address at the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s National
(AIPLA) Meeting (Oct. 19, 2000) (transcript available from Steven Lipman at Oblon, Spivak,
McClelland, Maier, & Neustadt, P.C.); USPTO White Paper Executive Summary, Automated
Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html:
This class contains numerous small groupings and four major groupings directed to
specific and general business data processing machines and methods. These machines
and methods still heavily reflect the electrical and computer engineering that underlay
them. Class 705 saw about [one percent] of the total patent applications filed at the
USPTO in FY 1999. Its 2658 applications did not even place it among the top five
Communications and Information Processing technologies.
USPTO White Paper on Class 705 (Modern Business Data Processing), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/class705.htm; Talis Dszenitis, American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999 is Law, Subtitle C - The “First Inventor Defense Act of 1999,” available
at http://www.uspto.gove/web/offices/dcom/olia/aipa/summary.htm (last visited June 15, 2001).
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look at the language of the statute11 and the Act’s ancestral roots,12 however,
makes plausible the conclusion that Congress created a broader defensive tool
than it intended. It is quite likely that the courts will have to determine, or
Congress will have to clarify, the scope of what is meant by a “business
method.” In fact, because of the flood of patent applications to the PTO since
the State Street decision,13 Congress has been busy attempting to clarify the
scope of patentable business methods.14
Because The First Inventors Defense Act of 1999 is a shadow of an
affirmative defense once contemplated by Congress15 that would have
extended an affirmative defense to holders of trade secrets, this comment will
first examine the nexus of trade secret and patent law, their competing
interests, and the scopes of their respective protections. It will then look at
whether Congress missed an opportunity to provide prior user’s rights not only
to inventors who have reduced patentable business methods to practice, but
also to “first inventors” of processes, machines, manufactures or compositions
of matter who have kept their inventions out of the public domain.

11. 35 U.S.C § 273 (a)(1) (2001) (“[T]he terms ‘commercially used’ and ‘commercial use’
mean use of a method in the United States, so long as such use is in connection with an internal
commercial use. . .whether or not the subject matter at issue is accessible to or otherwise known
to the public. . .”); 35 U.S.C § 273 (a) (3) (2001) (“[T]he term ‘method’ means a method of doing
or conducting business”).
12. Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 88 (1994) [hereinafter
Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents)]. This is not an exhaustive lineage of FIDA. It
showcases, however, strong arguments for the benefits of prior user’s rights (e.g., first inventor’s
defense) in suits for patent infringement. See also, Pierre Jean Hubert, The Prior User Right of
H.R. 400: A Careful Balancing of Competing Interests, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 189, 212 (discussing The Twenty-First Century Patent System Improvement Act, H.R.
400, 105th Cong. (1997)), which would have created international equity between U. S. and
foreign inventors:
The inclusion of a prior user right in the U. S. patent law would redress a current
imbalance of rights between U.S. and foreign businesses. [Many] foreign countries
provide for a prior user right in their patent laws. U.S. businesses that hold patents in
those countries cannot enforce these patents against prior users. However, the converse is
not true.
13. Legislation/Patents Bill Would Tighten PTO Procedure for Issuing Business Method
Patents, BNA’s PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 60, No.1493, ¶ 3 (October 6,
2000), at http://ipcenter.bna.com/ipcenter/1,1103,1_633,00.html. “With the State Street decision,
the floodgates opened and the PTO was swamped with business method patent applications.
Between 1998 and 1999, the number of Class 705 applications on computer-implemented
business methods grew from 1,300 to 2,600.”
Id.
14. Business Method Patent Improvement Act, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong (2000).
15. Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents), supra note 12.
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II. PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS
A.

What are they, what do they promote and what do they protect?
1. Patents

Since ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the national government has
granted monopolies, for limited times, to inventors.16 With the monopoly
comes the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention.17 The policy underlying this protected grant is as stated in the
Constitution itself: to promote the progress of the useful arts.18 In other words,
the federal government makes a contract, of sorts, with inventors: as
consideration for the right to exclude others—for a limited time—from using
one’s invention,19 the inventor is required to share his or her invention with the
public. In this way, other innovative persons, inventors, competitors, and the
general public are afforded the opportunity to first, be notified of the invention
and second, to improve upon it.20 The escalating effect upon the world is that
know-how, technology, useful machines and the like are continually improved.
Consequently, the general welfare of the public is enhanced and overall
progress is promoted.
There are generally three distinct classes of patents in the United States:
(1) utility patents on the functional aspects of products and processes; (2)
design patents on the ornamental design of useful objects; and (3) plant patents
on new varieties of living plants.21 Patents do no protect “ideas”—only
structures and methods that apply technological concepts.22 In fact, the United
States Supreme Court has identified three specific categories of subject matter
that are unpatentable: laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.23
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . . Discoveries.”).
17. MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 311 (J. Thomas
McCarthy ed., 2d ed. 1995).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (2001). “[The] grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
was filed in the United States . . . .” Id.
20. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966). Thomas Jefferson might well be
called the “first administrator of our patent system.” (quoting Federico, Operation of the Patent
Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 237, 238 (1936)). Jefferson clearly recognized the social and
economic rationale of the patent system. “The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring
forth new knowledge.” Id.
21. MCCARTHY’S, supra note 17.
22. Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
23. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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Generally, the requirements for patentability are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102 and 103; in essence, an invention must (1) have utility, (2) be novel and
(3) be nonobvious.24
2.

Trade Secrets

Trade secrets, emanating from the laws of unfair competition, typically
consist of information held in secret by a person or entity in order to maintain
or gain a competitive edge in the marketplace. The Restatement of the Law,
Third, Unfair Competition defines a trade secret as “any information that can
be used in the operation of a business. . .that is sufficiently valuable and secret
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”25 The rights
to such information may last indefinitely because, by definition, the trade
secret is a secret. However, once any portion of a trade secret enters the public
domain, secrecy is destroyed and the disclosed information—as a protectable
interest—is no longer protectable.26 The state laws protecting trade secrets are

24. An exhaustive analysis of these requirements is not the objective of this comment. But
see generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 7-9 (thoroughly treating all three
requirements for the first time). The latter requirement, nonobviousness, was codified in the
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1998).
Useful. §101: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Novelty. §102. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States, or. . .
Nonobvious. §103: A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (emphasis added). See also
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). “We assume that almost any knowledge
or information used in the conduct of one’s business may be held by its possessor in secret.” Id.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 25, cmt. c. “Thus, for matter
disclosed in the patent, issuance terminates the secrecy required for continued protection as a
trade secret, even if the patent is subsequently declared invalid . . . the filing of a patent
application does not in itself preclude continued protection of the invention as a trade secret.” Id.
See also Randy Kay, A Distance Runner’s Guide to Trade Secret Protection—Maintaining
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designed to encourage investment in research, promote the exploitation of
knowledge, and to punish unlawful misappropriation.27 Viewed in this light,
does it not seem that federal patent law protects similar interests and
encourages similar endeavors?
The similarity in objective notwithstanding, valid patents are limited in
term, afforded federal protection as to the inventor’s right to exclude others
from the use of such patents, and bring useful information into the public
domain. Trade secrets, to the contrary, may last forever, are afforded
protection by state unfair competition laws, and are concealed from the public.
3. The Effect of Prior Art
Claims, by the “inventor,” to protectable subject matter in the form of
either a patent or a trade secret are thwarted by the public disclosure of the
intellectual “information.” In other words, if a trade secret is made public, the
secret no longer exists. If the embodied practice of a particular invention is
made public, that information, generally speaking, may not be patented. It is in
the rights and obligations of the holder of a novel piece of useful information
or novel invention that the two are treated differently. The holder of a patent,
for a limited time, may license his invention, improve upon it (as may others),
assign or sell it to another, abandon it or simply admire it. The holder of a
trade secret, on the other hand, may use the information to further his
enterprise and is obligated, if he desires to maintain its secrecy, to take
reasonable measures to protect it.28
Analysis
The new defense provided, presumably, only to practitioners of certain
business methods (35 U.S.C. § 273) claimed by another should not be denied
to trade secret holders. Both groups keep useful, and in some cases,
patentable29 subject matter out of the public domain; their motives for doing so
should be irrelevant. For years, parties with potentially patentable business
methods mistakenly believed their inventions to be unpatentable,30 whereas

Secrecy (2000), at http://www.graycary.com/articles/ipu/ipu_sum004.html (last visited June 15,
2001).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 15, at cmt. a.
28. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
However, the measures do not have to be extraordinary. In the context of industrial espionage, at
least, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: “Perhaps ordinary fences and
roofs must be built to shut out incursive eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of a trade
secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of
espionage now available.” Id. (emphasis added).
29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and 103 (2001).
30. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375.
Since its inception, the “business method” exception has merely represented the
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trade secret holders have retained information for competitive business
purposes. The fact that the courts have gotten it wrong, according to the
Federal Circuit, for nearly half a century should not be used to punish trade
secret holders by denying them the use of the affirmative defense. Herein lies
the rub of the limited scope of the First Inventor’s Defense Act of 1999. If
practitioners of business methods should be afforded an affirmative defense
against infringement where another subsequently patents, then why is the same
defense not also available to practitioners of other types of potentially
“patentable” processes held as trade secrets?
4. Hypotheticals
Consider the following two scenarios.
Scenario 1 – “Patentable” Trade Secret
Suppose Company A had practiced, for twenty-five years, a proprietary
process for making or formulating a pharmaceutically active drug. Company
A, through its innovative manufacturing process which meets the statutory
requirements of patentability, maintained a competitive edge in the
marketplace by successfully keeping its process a secret.
Company B, a subsequent producer of the same drug, is granted a patent
whose claims contain some of the elements of Company A’s secret process.
Insofar as the “overlapping” claims are concerned, Company A, the original
“inventor,” would be without an affirmative defense in a patent infringement
action brought by the latecomer, Company B.
Scenario 2 – Patentable Business Method
Suppose Company C had practiced, for ten years, a proprietary data processing
method used to monitor individual mutual fund investments pooled into a
single portfolio. Through its innovative business method, which meets the
statutory requirements of patentability, Company C maintained a competitive
edge in the marketplace only by keeping its processing system a secret.
Company D, an ambitious newcomer to the business of accounting and
financial services, applies for and is granted a patent whose claims contain
some, but not all, of the elements of Company C’s secret methods. Because
Company C, acting in good faith, had actually reduced the subject matter to
practice at least one year before the effective filing date of Company D’s
patent, and used the method for commercial purposes, Company C would have
an affirmative defense in an infringement action brought by Company D.
application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out
of the “requirement for invention”—which was eliminated by §103. Since the 1952
Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Analysis
Does Scenario 1 seem like a fair result? An argument could be made, in
the wake of both the State Street decision and the Congressional response (35
USC § 273) to it, that the senior inventors in the two scenarios should not be
treated differently. The outcomes, however, are diametrically opposite given
the newly available affirmative defense enacted in 1999. Both companies, A
and C, were the first to invent their respective process or method. Competitors
B and D were both later “inventors.” Only C is allowed to raise the affirmative
defense in an action of infringement (D v. C). The trade secret holder, A, is
afforded no such defense in B v. A, because A’s process did not happen to be a
“business method.” Do these scenarios truly reflect reality of what happens in
practice? In the case of Scenario 1, there is judicial precedent, drafted by
Judge Learned Hand, established in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit that answers affirmatively.31 It is only a matter of time before
the First Inventor’s Defense Act, in a situation like Scenario 2, is tested in the
courts.
It may appear from the preceding discussion that because there are
numerous similarities (though important differences) between federal patent
law and state trade secret law, that the protections afforded patent holders
trump those afforded trade secret holders. A discussion that dispels such a
conclusion is warranted before proceeding to the language of The First
Inventors Defense Act and the Congressional intent beneath it.
B.

Where the Twain Shall Meet: Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.

In a landmark decision at the nexus of patent and trade secret law, the
United States Supreme Court held that Ohio’s law of trade secrets was not
preempted by federal patent law, thereby overturning a Sixth Circuit decision
which had declared the contrary.32 The Court gives thorough treatment to what
31. Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 30 (2d. Cir. 1940).
We need not, however, pass upon this question [whether prior use was in fact
established], or indeed whether the evidence of its date of production satisfied the
exacting standard set by the Barbed Wire Patent Case, 143 U.S. 275, 12 S.Ct. 443, 450,
36 L.Ed. 154, for it is clear that it was never in prior “public use,” and that [defendant]
was not a “first inventor.” It was always kept as strictly secret as was possible,
consistently with its exploitation. In general, everybody was carefully kept out of
[defendant’s] shop where the four machines were used.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 670 F. Supp. 861,
868 (E.D. Mo. 1987). The plaintiff established that the defendant had not created prior art
because defendant corporation “sought to conceal its process throughout the 1970’s.” Id.
32. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). However, the Kewanee
Court, at 480, quoted itself on the matter in an earlier opinion. See, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964), wherein the Court stated “if the scheme of protection
developed by Ohio respecting trade secrets ‘clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws,’ then the state law must fall.” Id.
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has been discussed heretofore, but one of the important inquiries in Kewanee
Oil was the Court’s analysis of disclosure (the objective of patent law) as it
relates to trade secret law. The Court recognized that trade secrets fall into
three categories: “(1) the trade secret believed by its owner to constitute a
validly patentable invention; (2) the trade secret known to its owner not to be
patentable; and (3) the trade secret whose valid patentability is considered
dubious.”33 The greatest conflict for the Court were those innovations where
the owner of the trade secret believed the subject matter to meet the
requirements of patentability.34 Despite the Court’s concern with the inventor
who holds a patentable invention in the form of a trade secret, it concluded by
saying “the extension of trade secret protection to clearly patentable inventions
does not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure.”35 So, while protections
for both trade secrets and patents may coexist amicably, the primary question
in this comment is whether an affirmative defense should be available to a
defendant where the plaintiff, an inventor who subsequently patents “over”
defendant’s trade secret, sues for infringement.
In Kewanee Oil, the plaintiff corporation executed nondisclosure
agreements with parting employees preventing them from disclosing the
company’s method for growing very large sodium iodide crystals—a process
which, more than likely, would have been patentable. The Supreme Court
upheld a permanent injunction (for misappropriation) against the competitor
corporation (defendant), who soon after hiring the departed employees, was
able to grow the same large crystals. Mr. Justice Douglas for the dissent, citing
precedent, declared “[w]e held that when an article is unprotected by a patent
[e.g., a trade secret], state law may not forbid others to copy it, because every
article not covered by a valid patent is in the public domain.”36 He was very
concerned that when an otherwise patentable invention is held in secret, it
should not be afforded a greater term of protection (then, seventeen years from

33. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484.
34. Id. at 489.
It is here that the federal interest in disclosure is at its peak; these inventions, novel, useful
and nonobvious, are “the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an
exclusive patent,” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., supra note 20, at 9). . .The interest
of the public is that the bargain of [a term] of exclusive use in return for disclosure be
accepted. If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that
holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state
protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally
continue to exist. In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence from
patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents exists.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 495 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co,, 376 U.S. at 225; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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date of patent issue) than the federal patent system affords.37 This is where the
philosophical debate arises. Had the defendant in Kewanee Oil applied for and
been granted a patent for the method of synthesizing large sodium iodide
crystals instead of misappropriating the trade secret, what would have been the
result? Could the patent holder have enjoined the “senior inventor” (the
plaintiff) from practicing his craft? Should the latecomer be permitted to do
so?
Analysis
It seems that based on both the holding in Kewanee Oil and on the
apparent unfairness of Scenario 1, supra, that where a trade secret—held by a
senior practitioner—meets the requirements of patentability,38 a junior
inventor, with a pertinent patent in hand, should not have the right to bring an
infringement action against the senior innovator, who for competitive
purposes, willfully maintained the secrecy of his invention. This is not to say
that the senior practitioner should be allowed to extend the monopoly of his or
her trade secret by subsequently receiving a patent. This would undermine the
constitutional underpinnings of our patent system; but neither should he or she
be enjoined from practicing that which has been reduced to practice for some
time.
II. FROM HOTEL SECURITY CHECKING TO STATE STREET BANK & TRUST:
NINETY YEARS OF THE BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in
1982 and is frequently referred to as the “Supreme Court of patent law.”39 The
gravity of the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street sparked countless notes,
comments and essays.40 The origins of the precedent (against patentability of
business methods) overturned in State Street are found in the holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
37. Id.
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and 103 (2001).
39. Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning Lead
to Thin Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
40. Id. See also Christopher A. Brown, Intellectual Property Law: Recent Developments in
Intellectual Property Law, 32 IND. L. REV. 909 (1999); S.E. Francisc Marius Keeley-Domokos, I.
Intellectual Property: B. Patent: 2. Patentability: (b) Business Models: State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153 (1999); John R. Thomas,
The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad For Business?, 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
263 (2000); Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protection for Software-Related Inventions in the
Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1118 (2000); Sari Gabay, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business Systems in the
Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 8 J.L. & POL’Y
179 (1999).
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Lorraine Co. (Hotel Security) in 1908.41 The claimed invention in Hotel
Security described a method of and means for cash-registering and accountchecking designed to prevent frauds and embezzlement by waiters and cashiers
in hotels and restaurants.42 The method of conducting business involved an
elaborate scheme by which employees—primarily managers, waiters and
cashiers—would conduct themselves in order to prevent theft and promote
equity in the sharing of tips. The Second Circuit did not hold the business
method invalid, per se.43 The holding of the Court turned on the claims of the
business method patent, which when compared with the prior art, were such
“as would occur to anyone conversant with the business.”44 Whether aware of
it or not, the Second Circuit was continuing to synthesize the third requirement
of patentability, nonobviousness, that would not be codified for another fortyfour years.45 Nevertheless, the opinions and holdings of Hotel Security
established the “business method exception” that stood for ninety years until
State Street.46 In the wake of Hotel Security,47 the PTO adopted Hotel Security
by incorporating into its Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP) the
notion that business methods were not patentable subject matter within the
meaning of the Patent Act.48 Patent examiners in the PTO employ the MPEP
to examine patent claims and under its guidelines, rejected methods of doing
41. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d. Cir. 1908).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 472.
If at the time of Hicks’ application, there had been no system of bookkeeping of any kind
in restaurants, we would be confronted with the question whether a new and useful system
of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as is patentable under the statue.
This question seems never to have been decided by a controlling authority and its decision
is not necessary now unless we find that Hicks has made a contribution to the art which is
new and useful.
Id.
44. Id. at 471.
45. Id. Compare the court’s language, “as would occur to anyone conversant with the
business,” with the language in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1999): “would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.” See also Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850), for what is
believed to be the genesis of the nonobviousness requirement: “no more ingenuity or skill was
required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business.” Id.
46. Hotel Sec., 160 F. at 472. “We are convinced that there is no patentable novelty either in
the physical means employed or in the method described and claimed in the Hicks patent.” Id.
The court never said, however, that such a method could never be patented. Id.
47. The Second Circuit upheld the “business method exception” faithfully, even where other
Circuits (e.g. 6th, 7th Cir.) were upholding the validity of patents for certain business methods.
See, e.g., Latz v. Reliance Graphic Corp., 98 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 59 S. Ct.
154 (1938); see also Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926).
48. Gabay, supra note 40, at 201, referring to the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 706.03 (a) (1994) [hereinafter MPEP].
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business by finding that such methods were not within the scope of the four
statutory categories of patentability.49
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of the State Street
decision on January 11, 1999, letting stand the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the
business method exception to patentability.50 The defendant in State Street
challenged the validity of the claimed invention at issue raising two
longstanding judicially-created exceptions to statutory subject matter: the
business method exception and the mathematical algorithm exception. The
business method exception had generally been considered the weaker of the
two affirmative defenses.51 The mathematical algorithm exception generally
provides that “[a] mathematical formula alone, . . .viewed in the abstract, is
considered unpatentable subject matter.”52 If such an algorithm were applied
in a useful way, however, it may be patentable if it meets the other two
requirements of patentability: novelty and nonobviousness.53 Neither defense
was effective in the particular facts of State Street and the business method
exception was laid to rest.54 The algorithm exception did not apply because
the software invention at issue produced a concrete, tangible and useful
result.55
The opinion in State Street has been analyzed extensively56 and has had
pervasive effects on the manner in which the PTO examines and grants
business method patent applications.57 Additionally, it has sparked more than

49. Gabay, supra note 40, at 201 (noting that The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
upheld the business method exception as the basis for rejection in Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
1819, 1820 (1988)); see also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983), for an example illustrative of the disagreement between the
examiners in the PTO and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as to whether business
methods were patentable subject matter. After State Street, the accounting system in Murray
would not be automatically excluded from patent protection on the grounds that it is an
unpatentable business method, per se. Rather, the test is whether the system has practical utility
and produces a “useful, tangible and concrete result.”
50. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
51. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. “The business method exception to patentability has never
been invoked by this court, or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable.” Id.
52. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
53. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
54. Id. at 1375.
55. Id. “For purpose of our analysis . . . claim 1 is directed to a machine programmed with
the Hub and Spoke software and admittedly produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result . . .
[t]his renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in numbers, such as
price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.” Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (en banc)).
56. See supra note 40.
57. Gabay, supra note 40, at 217-19. See also USPTO White Paper, Executive Summary,
supra note 10.
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one legislative response by Congress58 that will have untold effects on the
scope of what is statutory subject matter within Title 35 of the United States
Code.
While the impact of State Street has been far-reaching, the merits of
whether its reversal of the long-standing business method exception is sound or
the right direction for what ought to be statutory subject matter in the U.S.
patent system, is left to others.59 More important, for purposes of this
comment, is the manner in which Congress responded to State Street via the
enactment of the First Inventor’s Defense Act.
III. FIRST INVENTOR’S DEFENSE ACT (35 U.S.C. §273): CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE TO STATE STREET
A.

A Look at 35 U.S.C. § 273—“The New Deal?”
1. Plain Meaning

As noted supra, The First Inventors Defense Act was signed into law
November 29, 1999 and is codified as 35 U.S.C. § 273. The new law provides,
in general, that
[I]t shall be a defense to an action for infringement . . . with respect to any
subject matter that would otherwise infringe one or more claims for a method
in the patent being asserted against a person, if such person had, acting in good
faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least [one] year before
the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject
matter before the effective filing date of such patent.60

The requirements for infringement of a patent are set forth in Section 271(a):
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented
invention, within the United States. . .during the term of the patent therefore,
infringes the patent.” The party eligible to raise the defense, when sued for
infringement, must have reduced the subject matter to practice at least one year
prior to the effective filing date of the patentee. This seems like a reasonable
requirement and Company A, in our trade secret hypothetical, supra, would
easily satisfy the requirement. An additional time requirement imposed
requires that the party asserting the defense not only reduce the subject matter
to practice but also commercially use the method. Commercial use is defined
as “use of a method in the United States, so long as such use is in connection
with an internal commercial use . . . whether or not the subject matter at issue
is accessible to or otherwise known to the public. . . .”61 The definition of
58.
59.
60.
61.

Costello, supra note 2; 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2001); H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
CHISUM, supra note 39; supra note 40.
35 U.S.C. § 273 (b)(1) (2001).
See id. § 273 (a)(1) (2001).
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method is “a method of doing or conducting business.”62 Company A, having
utilized the drug manufacturing process for twenty-five years, would meet the
second time requirement as well.
Analysis
Applying the statute to Scenario 1, Company A used the method of
conducting business in connection with an internal commercial use (a process
to internally manufacture drugs) where the subject matter was not accessible to
the public, i.e., it was a trade secret. Presumably, Company A, if sued for
infringement, should be able to raise the defense since it met the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 273. In other words if practitioners of business methods are
afforded prior user rights, then perhaps, so should entities practicing
manufacturing processes. This assertion notwithstanding, the entire scope of
protection for practitioners of a broader interpretation of business methods will
have to be determined in the courts. As with any legislation, however, the
explicit limitations seem apparent.63
Most people interested in patent reform legislation have settled on the
notion that 35 U.S.C. § 273 is strictly geared toward business methods of the
nature in State Street.64 Applying the plain meaning of the statute to our
hypothetical, however, would possibly lead some to a different conclusion.
Consider again, Scenario 1, supra. In short, Company A practiced a
proprietary process for making a drug for twenty five years; the company
enjoyed the fruits of its labor by selling the proprietary drug itself but
maintained certain key aspects of the process for manufacturing the drug a
trade secret. It turns out that the trade secret itself was patentable subject
matter, but because it had been commercially practiced in secret, it could not

62. See id. § 273 (a)(3) (2001).
63. Robert C. Haldiman, Business Method Patents, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001)
The method must have been in commercial use, or used by a non-profit entity such as a
university or hospital, before the filing date of the patent and must have been reduced to
practice one year before the effective date of the patent. The alleged infringer must have
acted in good faith. The defense is personal—sale of the method exhausts the right to the
prior user defense; the defense may not be raised if the method was derived from the
patentee or its privities, and cannot be raised if the use had been abandoned; the defense is
site specific—[and, therefore] may only be raised for alleged infringement at the sites at
which the methods have actually been used. In the event of a merger or acquisition, the
defense remains available, again, only at the site at which it had been used. The defense
cannot be used to establish invalidity under §§ 102 or 103. If unsuccessful, raising the
defense and failing automatically allows the patent holder to request enhanced damages
under § 285.
Id.
64. Thomas, supra note 5. See also Lipman, supra note 10; Dzenitis, supra note 10.
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now be the subject of a valid U.S. patent.65 According to 35 U.S.C. §273 (b),
the subject matter would infringe one or more claims of Company B in our
hypothetical (remember that Company B was recently granted a patent
covering at least some facets of Company A’s process). Let us assume that
Company A met the other requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 273 (a) and (b).
Company A acted in good faith, reduced the subject matter to practice and
commercially used the “method of doing business” within the required time
frame; its use was in the United States and was consistent “with an internal
commercial use;” and the subject matter, in the form of a trade secret, was
never accessible or known to the public. As long as Company A practiced its
methods at the same manufacturing facility (location), this commentator
contends that it would not only be eligible to raise the defense (FIDA, §273) in
an action for infringement brought by Company B, but ought to prevail on the
point as well. From the plain meaning of §273, such a conclusion is at least
plausible.
The plain meaning analysis of the statutory language generally begins and
ends the judicial inquiry unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly shown.66
If one accepts that there exists some ambiguity in the “plain language” of the
statute as to the scope of “business methods,” a look at the legislative intent is
in order.
2. Congressional Intent
Senator Schumer, on the Senate floor, discussing what would eventually
become The American Inventors Protection Act, spoke on point about the
intent of the statute ultimately enacted.67 He stated that a method “includes a
practice, process, activity, or system that is used in the design, formulation,

65. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490. “The possibility that an inventor who believes his
invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one
year of use forfeit any right to patent protection, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), is remote indeed.” Id.
66. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v U.S., 878 F.2d 362, 365 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
67. 106 CONG. REC. S14836 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer):
This defense provides a first inventor (or ‘prior user’) with a defense in patent
infringement lawsuits, whenever an inventor of a business method (i.e., a practice[,]
process or system) uses the invention but does not patent it. . . the term ‘method’ is
intended to be construed broadly. The term ‘method’ is defined as meaning ‘a method of
doing or conducting business.’ Thus, ‘method includes any internal method of doing
business, a method used in the course of doing or conducting business, or a method for
conducting business in the public marketplace. It includes a practice, process, activity, or
system that is used in the design, formulation, testing, or manufacture of any product or
service. The defense will be applicable against method claims, as well as the claims
involving machines or articles the manufacturer used to practice such methods (i.e.,
apparatus claims) . . . the first inventor defense is intended to protect both method claims
and apparatus claims.
Id. (emphasis added).
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testing, or manufacture of any product or service.” Additionally, Rep. Howard
Coble, in his remarks to the House of Representatives, made it clear that the
legislation was directed towards any industry relying on trade secrecy for
protecting the operations of their businesses.68
Our senior drug manufacturer, Company A, who had relied on trade
secrecy, would presumably be protected. Certainly, its processes qualify as
“intermediate manufacturing procedure[s]. . .producing a useful end
result. . .for external sale.”
Imbedded within the legislative history of prior user’s rights is either
continued ambiguity about what 35 U.S.C. § 273 is intended to encompass, or
a clear mandate that the affirmative defense is available to nearly any person
who had practiced a secret internal process or method, used by a company or
person, to achieve a useful end result in the interest of the business.69 The
longstanding debate on prior user rights with regard to patents, however, did
not begin with this most recent legislation.70
B.

Predecessor to the 1999 Version of §273: Rights Based on Prior Use
(Defense to Infringement), 1994

68. 106 CONG. REC. E1788 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (statement of Hon. Coble):
[C]hanges have been made to the bill [H.R. 1907] which are not reflected in the
committee report that was filed. I therefore intend that this document supplement the
report for purposes of detailing a more accurate legislative history of H.R. 1907 . . . The
title [referring to the House version of FIDA] clarifies the interface between two key
branches of intellectual property law—patents and trade secrets . . . this title focuses on
methods of doing and conducting business, including methods used in connection with
internal commercial operations as well as those used in connection with the sale or
transfer of useful end results—whether in the form of physical products, or in the form of
services, or in the form of some other useful results . . . for example . . . other inputs to
produce a useful result . . . The earlier inventor defense is important to many small and
large businesses, including financial services, software companies, and manufacturing
firms—any business that relies on innovative business processes and methods . . . The
method that is the subject matter of the defense may be an internal method for doing
business . . . or a method for conducting business such as a preliminary or intermediate
manufacturing procedure, which contributes to the effectiveness of the business by
producing a useful end result for the internal operation of the business or for external
sale . . . The first inventor defense is not limited to methods in any particular industry
such as the financial services industry, but applies to any industry which relies on trade
secrecy for protecting methods for doing or conducting the operations of their business.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents), supra note 12, at 1. According to the opening
statement of Chairman William J. Hughes, “[p]rior user rights is not a new issue, having been
previously considered by the subcommittee during the 102d Congress in the context of patent
harmonization.” Id.
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As stated, what is now codified as 35 U.S.C. § 273 was once slated to be a
broader form of “prior user’s rights.” It was not, however, to be an affirmative
defense limited merely to practitioners of business methods of the type in State
Street. In the hearings before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration, numerous persons from industry, academia,
government service, etc. weighed in on the matters at stake.71 Bruce Lehman,
the then Assistant Secretary of Commerce and the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, said that “[o]ur patent laws were not designed to force
American companies to seek patent protection for every invention . . .The
purpose, in fact . . . is to stimulate innovation . . . So if that innovation can be
stimulated or is stimulated even without patenting, we are still successful.”72
Mr. Lehman went on to state three sound reasons why prior innovators should
be afforded such a defense.
The prior user defense (1) will help parties more fairly and efficiently resolve
disputes that can arise when one party uses an innovation that is later patented
by another; (2) will eliminate the disparate treatment [between] American and
foreign manufacturers;73 and (3) could help resolve concerns that have been
expressed in the software industry . . . regarding prior use of poorly
documented techniques that are later patented by another.74

Robert P. Merges, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law,
concluded his statement to the Subcommittee with an argument for balance in
the competing systems of patent and trade secret law:
Currently, patent law sends mixed signals to inventors regarding trade secrecy.
In one sense, this is appropriate; one goal of patent law, to encourage
disclosure of technology, is stymied by trade secrets. On the other hand, many
inventions are of uncertain patentability, or occur in industries where firms do
not generally seek patent protection.
Patent and trade secret law must therefore be made to accommodate each
other. While current law achieves a workable accommodation, introducing
prior user rights would alter the balance favorably. This is so because prior
user rights, properly implemented, represent a significant benefit to those who
choose trade secret protection, without undercutting too seriously the rights of
subsequent patentees.75

Despite this and other reasoned pleas, this Bill did not survive Congress.
A look at the broad language of S.2272 (103d Congress, 2d Session) shows
why those opposed to upsetting decades of jurisprudence in the ether between

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents), supra note 12.
Id. at 5-6.
Hubert, supra note 12, at 211.
Prior User Rights (Relative to Patents), supra note 12, at 7.
Id. at 45.
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trade secret and patent law carried the day. The proposed legislation, which
would have become 35 U.S.C. § 273 (b), originally read as follows:
IN GENERAL.—A person shall not be liable as an infringer under a patent
granted to another with respect to any subject matter claimed in the patent that
such person had, acting in good faith, commercially used in the United States
or made effective and serious preparation therefore in the United States, before
the critical date.76

In the definition section of the same bill, “commercially used” was defined as
“the use in interstate or intrastate commerce, including the use of processes,
equipment, tooling, and intermediate materials in the design, testing or
production of commercial products whether or not such processes, equipment,
tooling, and intermediate material are normally accessible, available, or
otherwise known to the public . . . “77
Analysis
By comparison to what was eventually enacted into law as the First
Inventor’s Defense Act of 1999, it is easy to see, by negative implication, that
what Congress left on the “cutting room floor” in 1994, it did not intend to
encompass in the 1999 version. Arguably, however, the intent behind the prior
version of §273 survived, as evidenced in the sentiments expressed by Senator
Schumer and Representative Coble, discussed supra.78 The intent of both
legislators was to clarify the meaning of “method” by reciting the more
rudimentary notions of the types of subject matter that are, or have been,
traditionally protected in the United States for over two hundred years. What
should fall within the statute is “any . . . practice, process, activity, or system
that is used in the design, formulation, testing, or manufacture of any product
or service”79 and “any industry which relies on trade secrecy for protecting
methods for doing or conducting the operations of their business.”80 The
breadth of such intent should not be ignored.
IV. CONGRESS REMAINS DISSATISFIED: THE BUSINESS METHOD PATENT
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2000, H.R. 5364
As mentioned, supra, the Patent and Trademark Office was bombarded
with patent applications for divers business methods after the Federal Circuit
opened the doors, in State Street, to presumably new patentable subject
matter.81 The PTO has received unwelcome scrutiny regarding its review
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
SCHUMER, supra note 67; Coble, supra note 68.
SCHUMER, supra note 67.
COBLE, supra note 68.
BNA’s PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 60, no. 1493, supra note 13.
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procedures for business method patent applications and for the types of prior
art it researches in examining such applications.82 Representative Boucher,
during the introduction of H.R. 5364 remarked that “there is something
fundamentally wrong with a system that allows individuals to get patents for
doing the seemingly obvious.”83 The intent of the legislation, introduced
jointly with Rep. Howard Berman (D-Cal.), is to improve the overall
examination procedures for business method applications; the purpose is not to
prohibit the award of monopolies for such inventions.84 There are numerous
provisions in the bill,85 but Section 2 would codify a new definition of
“business methods as 35 U.S.C. § 100 (f):”
The term business method means (1) a method of (A) administering,
managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise or organization, including a
technique used in doing or conducting business; or (B) processing financial
data; (2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and (3)
any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in paragraph (1)
or a technique described in paragraph (2).86

The proposed bill, as currently drafted, seems fairly hostile to the broader
scope of business methods called for in this comment. Remember that a
broader scope of business methods would afford practitioners of such methods
(e.g., formerly held as trade secrets in reliance on the advice of attorneys and
judicial decision) the right to invoke the affirmative defense in 35 U.S.C. § 273
in suits of infringement. But the language defining what is a business method
focuses on financial data processing, coaching techniques and computerassisted implementations. This notwithstanding, the very first definition still
seems somewhat vague: “a method of . . . otherwise operating an enterprise or
organization.” Our drug manufacturer (Company A) in Scenario 1, discussed
throughout this comment, might still argue that his process of manufacture
falls within this definition of business methods.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior user’s rights relating to patent protection and affirmative defenses to
infringement have been debated extensively for at least a decade in the United
States. The competing interests involve, on the one hand, the long standing
motive behind the Constitutional imperative to promote the sharing of useful
knowledge within the public domain and, on the other hand, the means
available to practitioners of commercially useful methods and processes which
allow for the protection of trade secrets, giving such innovators the ability to
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 5364, supra note 14.
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maintain a competitive edge in a free market economy. The legislative and
executive branches of our government failed to consummate an earlier version
of prior user’s rights in 1994. In the face of new technology, pressure from
industry, and the Federal Circuit’s opinion in State Street overturning the
business method exception to patentability, Congress promulgated the First
Inventors Defense Act of 1999—only one small portion of the sweeping
reform implemented in the United States Patent and Trademark Office. By
inference, most commentators believe that the Congressional response to State
Street, is intended to only cover intangible business methods, e-commerce
software or business methods, or mathematical algorithms generating useful
results. If this is true, in essence, Congress was successful in passing
legislation that is merely a penumbra of a true and complete affirmative
defense of prior user’s rights. I suggest, in the alternative, that the language of
what has been codified in 35 U.S.C. § 273 is ambiguous and open for broader
interpretation. An analysis of the legislative intent, if indeed the plain meaning
is construed as ambiguous by the federal courts, will show that Congress
intended a broader umbrella than what most commentators believe was
ultimately enacted. Additionally, it is in the best interest of U.S. inventors to
make available a number of means for the protection of the useful arts. The
words of Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Kewanee Oil are on
point:
Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one
hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one
does not take away from the need for the other. Trade secret law encourages
the development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention
than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still
have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement
of the Nation. Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the
efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the
rewards of his labor by contracting with a company large enough to develop
and exploit it. Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the
wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until
Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free to grant
protection to trade secrets.87

Indeed, Congress has remained silent on the issue of keeping trade secret
protection within the jurisdiction of the States. But the larger point by Justice
Burger is that trade secret law, like patent law, also promotes the sharing of
knowledge and permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor.
Why then, should the trade secret holders, who commercially practice their
processes or methods continually, not be afforded the privilege of the
affirmative defense offered in 35 U.S.C. § 273? It is the contention of this

87. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493.
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comment that prior users or first inventors should have, at their disposal, this
important protection.
JEFFREY P. DUKE*
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